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The Importance of the Human Factor in Banking’s Organisational Overhaul: Evolution and Systematics Between Two Crises

Álvaro Saiz-Sepúlveda (*)

ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0315-2571

alvaro.saiz@urjc.es

Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

Paseo de los Artilleros S/N, 28032, Madrid, España

Carmen Orden-Cruz

ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1411-9286

carmen.delaorden@urjc.es

Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

Paseo de los Artilleros S/N, 28032, Madrid, España

Camilo Prado-Román

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1540-0643

camilo.prado@urjc.es

Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

Paseo de los Artilleros S/N, 28032, Madrid, España

Received: 5-8-2022; Acepted: 5-12-2022; Published: 30-12-2022

Abstract

Objective: This study aims to highlight the evolution of three systemically important financial institutions in Spain in the 11-year period between two major crises, the first known in Spain as the “brick crisis” (property bubble) and the second derived from the Covid-19 pandemic. This study focuses on the treatment and management of human resources as the driving force behind organisational changes in the financial sector, aimed not only at cost savings, but at digitally revolutionizing the business. The aim is to highlight the importance of the human factor in the organisational overhaul of the banking sector.

Methodology: We have followed a methodology that includes economic/financial analysis of the data and ratios contained in balance sheets and annual reports, covering the information provided to shareholders and stakeholders.

Results: The evolutionary design of banking in terms of its parameters follows a line that has already been drawn, suggesting an acceleration of processes resulting from the two recent crises.

Limitations: A larger number of banks would make it possible to generalize the study’s findings.

Practical implications: To facilitate the understanding of a certain line of action common to all financial institutions, in the relationship between human resources and economic results.

Keywords: efficiency; assets; solvency; human resources.

Codes JEL: G21; G28

人的因素对于银行业组织变革的重要性。两次危机之间的系统性演变

文章摘要

研究目标: 本研究旨在强调西班牙三家系统性银行的演变,在观察的11年期间,它被置于两次重大危机之间,第一次在西班牙被称为 “砖头危机",第二次是由COVID-19引起的。它侧重于人力资源的处理和管理,作为金融业组织变革的驱动力,其目的不仅在于降低成本,还在于企业的数字革命。其目的是强调人的因素在银行业组织变革中的重要性。

分析方法: 用经济-财务分析的方法对资产负债表和年度报告中的数据及比率进行分析,用来提供给股东和利益相关者的信息。

调查结果: 银行业在参数方面的演变设计遵循一条已经设计好的线,我们遇到的两次危机中的每一次都涉及到进程的加速。

研究局限: 如果研究有更多的银行参与,就有可能对研究结果进行概括。

实际应用: 在人力资源和经济成果的关系方面,促进对所有金融机构共同的某一行动方针的理解。

关键词: 比率; 效率; 资产; 偿付能力; 人力资源。

JEL 代码: G21; G28

1. Introduction

In general, banking contributes significantly to gross domestic product (GDP) in Spain. However, the years following the subprime crisis saw a decline on this front, mainly because the financial sector had been the most affected. From a starting point of 5.2% in 2009, when it made its largest historical contribution to GDP, contribution fell to 4.05% in 2021. In the new economic crisis generated by the Covid-19 epidemic, the financial sector was one of the few that recorded growth—2.4% over the previous year (INE, 2021)—with the same occurring in neighbouring economies. Giese and Haldane (2020) highlight the fact that the financial sector has adapted over the last decade, showing greater invulnerability to economic phenomena like the crises analysed. Bavoso (2020) states that the changes made by the monetary authority have worked in a favourable way, boosting the solvency of financial institutions.

Contextualizing the fundamental characteristics of both crises, it is worth noting a strong economic slowdown in the first, and a near standstill in the second, due to the confinements imposed in many countries (Li et al., 2022). Job destruction is another element worth noting. This paper endeavours to explore the differences in the financial aspects of banking.

According to Saiz (2019), the dynamics of control established by regulators have become more prevalent over time, from an initial moment with the enactment of the Basel I agreement, to the present, in which the latest Basel III Accords are being implemented, and work is already underway on the drafting of a new protocol. In 2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision noted that the regulatory framework developed thus far was not designed to protect banks from major losses (Comité de Supervisión Bancaria de Basilea, 2014). Despite the above, there is a need for a sufficient regulatory framework, which avoids the distortions that can be caused by internal conflicts within institutions during decision-making processes (Vousinas, 2015).

Financial institutions have tried to develop from within in the quest for survival and, above all, a return to profitability and profits, in the words of the current CaixaBank chairman, “with the intention of generating shareholder value” (Goirigolzarri, 2016). However, all of this depends on the human factor, as a bulwark of organisational change, although from a certain point onwards it is considered an amortisable cost or, better still, it can be eliminated to achieve greater income (Dávalos, 2015).

The main objective of this paper is to evaluate, from inside of the financial sector itself, some of the actions of systemic banks in Spain between the two major crises of the 21st century.

To achieve this, a series of relevant data are used, such as the evolution of business centres, employee volumes, the ratio comprised of the two indicators described above, the efficiency ratio, and profit for the year. These indicators are analysed using a representative sample of Spanish banks that carry out their activity under a regulatory framework governed by a common actor, with direct coordination from the Bank of Spain, assuming compliance with international conventions and supervisory oversight of the European Central Bank. The sample includes Banco Santander, Caixabank, and BBVA. The first has been considered a global systemic institution since 2011. For its part, CaixaBank, following the absorption of Bankia, has become the leading national institution in terms of volume, and is considered (according to figures) a bank with systemic capabilities. Finally, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) was considered a systemic bank between 2012 and 2014, according to the Financial Stability Board (Financial Stability Board, n.d.), with a growing volume that makes it once again worthy of such consideration, as it is involved in merger/takeover negotiations within the banking market.

The Bank of Spain (2021) established, in reference to the Financial Stability Board agreement on Global Systemically Important Banks, the renewal of Banco Santander as a Global Systemically Important Institution (G-SII). For this type of classification, the methodology developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is applied, as set out in Rule 13 of Circular 2/2016, which defines such importance based on the series of variables described. In addition, the Bank of Spain (2022) updated the list of other systemically important institutions, maintaining Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Banco de Sabadell, and CaixaBank, increasing the capital requirements for the latter, due to the absorption of Bankia.

The three institutions mentioned (plus Banco Sabadell, which is included in this calculation despite not being included in the study given the sizeable discrepancy in figures) hold a market share of Spanish financial activity near to or in excess of 70% (Caballero, 2020). They have therefore been chosen for their considerable size, while complying with Financial Stability Board regulations (FSB, n.d.).

This study aims to provide new evidence on the relationship between efficiency and cost reduction, beyond the standard framework of “higher revenue equals higher profit”, ratios, and parameters that in most cases are dissociated in other studies. It includes graphics and analyses of the different ratios and data from the three aforementioned entities from 2011 and 2021, selecting those that demonstrate the inverse correlation between efficiency ratios and the volume of employees at business centres. All of this serves to prove their linkage.

After this introduction, the second section reviews the literature; the third section presents the sample and the methodology of the study; the fourth section analyses the results; and the last section presents the conclusions of the study before the bibliography.

2. Literature review

Within economics and finance, one of the most frequently addressed systems is the management of financial institutions. Since the late 1960s, this discipline has analysed the market and based its theories on concepts of risk, solvency, and profitability (Altman, 1968). Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) indicate that it is not enough to evaluate balance sheets and profit and loss account, but that it is necessary to study a series of ratios in order to predict situations of conflict or solvency.

In Spain, preliminary work on bank risk analysis did not begin until the end of the 1980s (Pina, 1989). The most indicative ratios for assessing the possibilities of bankruptcy of an institution were also identified as those referring to current assets/total assets, current assets/debts, reserves/debts, etc., all of which are indicative of the risk of bankruptcy (Mar-Molinero and Serrano-Cinca, 2001).

While capital ratios are key indicators (Etudaiye-Muhtar and Abdul-Baki, 2020), analysis using financial stress models is no less important (Paule-Vianez et al., 2019). Stress tests are methods that analyse what could happen in different types of scenarios, both baseline and adverse, which—in the case of the latter—may be improbable but not impossible. The aim is to measure the response capacity of each financial institution in each of the situations considered.

According to Dávila (2003), prior to the subprime crisis, when the financial world had yet to glimpse the debacle that would ensue, significance was placed on personnel costs within operating costs. The volume of staff in the service of financial institutions, covering their operations, had recently become an evaluable parameter, both in terms of their training and number, the latter to secure a profit and loss account with lower operating burdens. In their study, Suárez and Bustos (2009) reflect the change of structures that had begun in the banking sector, when personal attention began to be replaced by applications to which users have direct access, no longer only via the computer, but also, and incipiently at the time, on their mobile phones. This was due to the banks’ need for greater efficiency, in light of the crises forcing them to restructure their systems and ways of working. The digital transformation is the opportunity to transition away from traditional systems, which are expensive to maintain and less efficient. In his study, carried out at the height of the financial crisis in Spain, Maudos (2012) analyses the need to reduce the costs of oversized institutions, both in terms of the number of business centres for customer service and the volume of employees.

Another study parameter used recently is the evaluation of business centres as necessary for effective customer contact (Maudos, 2017). The waning importance of the bank branch is the result of new technologies, the evolution of new habits, and the need to reduce costs (see Valverde and Fernández, 2020). Analysing the merger between CaixaBank and Bankia, Valverde and Fernández study the evolution of the multichannel digital environment as a source of boosting customer service capacity, without incurring the corresponding personnel costs.

The employee/business centre ratio took precedence through criteria set out after the first of the crises studied. Álvarez et al. (2006) highlight the idea of the presence of institutions with fewer centres (which would result in lower costs), but with more staff per centre. Cimarra (2020), addressing the problem at the present time, analyses what he calls installed capacity with the bank’s difficulties in obtaining profitability. Valverde and Fernández (2021) corroborate the increased resilience of banks due to accelerated digitisation during the pandemic and, with it, cost reduction.

Bank profitability is considered another of the most widely used ratios (Cimarra, 2020). The object of profitability is efficiency, which can be defined as the degree of optimisation achieved in the management of resources for the provision of services. Within the methodology developed, the technical efficiency models (Drake, et al., 2006) and the cost models (Maudos and Pastor, 2003) are noteworthy. Pastor and Serrano (2006) also address the efficiency of costs and benefits. Based on parametric models, Maudos (1996) was one of the first authors to study efficiency through technical change and productivity.

Analysing the results of the different financial years is another tool used to assess the profitability of banks, not only in terms of ROE. Strong banking competition has led to a reduction in profitability on a global level (Goddard et al., 2011), with profitability being limited mainly to the banks’ work and management profile. However, the literature analysed shows that the relationship between profitability and the business model is difficult to assess, due to the diversity of factors that intervene and/or may interfere (Ayadi et al., 2016). There are several studies that conclude that efficiency is directly related to profitability (Detragiache et al., 2018), although in this case, having focused the study on a very representative sample of 1,500 commercial banks operating in 148 countries, the direct relationship between volume and profitability is not clear (Shehzad et al., 2013).

3. Study sample and methodology

3.1. Sample

To carry out this analysis, the financial entities considered are Banco Santander, CaixaBank, and BBVA, which represent more than 64% of bank deposits in Spain (Sobrino, 17 May 2022).

Banco Santander was analysed in terms of its activity in Spain exclusively, though this only represents approximately 30% of the Group’s total consolidated activity. The main percentage of its activity derives from the United Kingdom, Poland, and countries in the southern cone of America. We have consulted a set of reports represented by the “TLAC Information” (Total Loss Absorbency Capacity), the annual financial and risk information contained in the reports published between 2011 and 2021 (inclusive), the Prudential Relevance Report (Pillar III of Basel), and the Report for other regulatory bodies. Also, in some cases to verify the information obtained, we accessed partial quarterly reports that the bank makes available to shareholders.

Pillar III of the Basel II Accords (a set of banking regulation proposals that came into force in 2004, subsequently updated by Basel III in December 2010) establishes a market discipline based mainly on banks’ provision of information about their capital, risk management, and risk exposure policies.

CaixaBank, the second of the institutions chosen for the study, is currently immersed in the absorption of Bankia. This situation can only lead to a considerable increase in the solvency of the new CaixaBank, not to mention the balance sheet figures, given that Bankia’s accounts are the subject of another study. It is also important to note that, although the merger took place in 2021, the information for the year was published in aggregate for the two institutions and only for certain parameters, thus hindering a pure, evolutionary analysis of the absorbing institution.

The analysis of the information focuses on the annual and half-yearly accounts, together with the report published annually under the heading other financial information. One unique feature of this institution, derived from a defunct savings bank, is the fact that the earliest accounts presented as a bank are those corresponding to financial year 2012, which are therefore those featured at the beginning of the study.

Finally, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), the third institution selected for the analysis, is a corporation with roughly half of its operations outside of Spain. In this respect, the consolidated accounts have been omitted from the study, being assessed only for the purpose of comparing data and additional information. The individual financial statements with auditor’s report and management report for the years 2011 through 2021 were used for the study. The annual financial report contained in the consolidated annual report was also assessed, as well as the Reports with prudential relevance – Basel Pillar III.

3.2. Methodology

In the study of the banking and finance function, a large number of ratios are used, some of which have already been mentioned. In this case, we have chosen to take five indicators into consideration for the analysis and determination of conclusions.

The set, which includes a ratio based on information obtained from two other indicators, enables an assessment of changing trends at financial institutions in their business focus and the repercussions on the human factor that designs them. Specifically, the data and ratios considered are: evolution of human resources, evolution of business centres, employee/office ratio, profit for the year, and efficiency ratio.

The first parameter to be analysed (evolution of human resources) uses the outbreak of the first crisis as a starting point and Covid-19 as an end point, given that, as of the publication of the 2021 financial statements (in 2022), the situation continued to evolve. As Europe and parts of North America re-opened, there were closures and even confinements in China. According to Alles (2011), human resources is a discipline belonging to the management sciences, although other names are now used to describe it, such as human capital, talent management, human talent, and so on. In this study, human capital is considered a productive force within the company for the designated purposes and should be considered when reducing costs, at times when income cannot be increased through traditional asset operations (Maudos, 2012).

We also examined the evolution of business centres as points of service and recruitment. During the +10-year period analysed, we traded the need for physical contact for lower costs through the elimination of centres that make transactions possible, and the transfer of this activity to technical means, mainly in an effort to comply with Covid health and safety regulations, avoid physical contact, and move towards remote customer care and recruitment systems, including computerized ones (Melgarejo, 2016).

The employee/office ratio aims to capture and reflect the dysfunction created in some cases between the attempt to reduce costs with the combination of the two aforementioned parameters, and the intentionality as a senior management system to establish changes in the structure and approach to operations at large institutions. It is worth mentioning the comments of the now-former BBVA chairman during the FY 2014 earning presentation on fewer but better equipped business centres (F. González, personal communication, 5 February 2015). We also seek a correlation between both sides of the ratio, considering the 46 bank branches per 100,000 inhabitants in Spain, compared to 20 on average in the European Union (Saiz and Hernández, 2021).

As a fourth input to this study, the analysis of the final net results for each financial year has been taken into consideration. This provides a clear, effective quantitative assessment, which allows a comparative framework to be established with regard to profitability, and thus with regard to the parameters described above.

Graph 1 shows the initial 2021 earnings forecast for the larger Spanish banks.

Graph 1. Estimated earnings of large Spanish banks

Source: De Antonio y Cruz (4 February 2022)

In their research, López and González (2014) highlight the importance of analysing the items that make up a bank’s profits, among other factors, in order to assess what can be considered recurring activity and predict evolution.

Lastly, this study considers the efficiency ratio, information from which links the income obtained to the expenditure required to generate it. The efficiency ratio is one way of measuring productivity, and is, unlike other figures, more positive when lower on a scale of 1 to 100 (Piot-Lepetit and Nzongang, 2014). It is calculated by dividing operating expenses by gross margin. A result of 60 would indicate the percentage that must be spent to generate 100% revenue. In this sense, Spanish banks achieve a ratio of 52.1, while European banks score 66.6 (EBA, 2020).

Finally, the analysis has been pooled for the three institutions, enabling a determination of best practices and compliance with the regulator’s instructions.

4. Analysis of results

In this section, the resulting data for each of the parameters for the three entities analysed are listed comparatively in order to obtain a solvent opinion on the principles of action in a joint assessment.

Starting with the number of employees, the subprime crisis triggered a shift in the expansive way banks worked, as Valverde and Fernández (2021) confirm, digitising transaction capacity in an effort to reduce costs through substitution without reducing efficiency. Cimarra (2020) agrees. Business centre closures are accompanied by staff reductions, a situation accelerated by the pandemic and its subsequent new trends. These trends, the result of confining populations in countless countries, boosted customer care, albeit remote or electronic, with obvious implications for human resources.

The period covered by the study seems sufficient to appreciate the performance continuity and change of systems among financial institutions. A review of the data confirms these patterns: what is known as the digital change in banking.

As an idea of the likely direction of action today in traditional banking and the parameters within which online or internet banking moves, it is worth mentioning that the average number of customers per branch in Spanish banking is just over 3,000, while ING’s management system currently has more than 130,000 customers per retail business centre (Saiz and Hernández, 2021).

In this part of the analysis, the minimum observation figure has been reduced, thereby reducing the relevance of the 2018 Banco Santander parameter, with an atypical increase of 9,500 employees, resulting from the absorption of Banco Popular. The same criterion is applied to BBVA’s 2012 absorption of Caixa Catalunya. Due to the deviation involved, CaixaBank’s absorption of Bankia, with an overall increase of almost 16,000 employees, has not been considered, but nevertheless, according to the information provided by the absorbing institution itself, between 8,000 and 10,000 will leave the institution in 2021/22.

Perhaps the most significant inference from Graph 2 is the tendency to downsize workforces in all cases, with an observable growing virulence; firstly, in the case of takeovers and/or mergers, in which a significant part of the acquired workforce is amortised in relatively short periods of time (two years); secondly, from the onset of the Covid-19 crisis which, though on track toward a healthcare/economic resolution due to the rapid response by regulators, is aggravated once again by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Graph 2. Evolution of the number of employees

Source: Prepared by authors (2022)

In his article, Moore (2019) describes the performance of human resources departments, as managers of commercial and executive functions. Computerization and monitoring tools allow organisations to carry out real-time analysis of the company’s needs and problems, all with the aim of optimising resources vis-á-vis results.

Ulate et al. (2020) study the changing habits that occurred with the pandemic, including teleworking, which largely eliminates the need to be present in business centres, given that a large part of the contacts and activities can be carried out using new technologies.

The digitisation of banking has been addressed by different works compiling this activity (Wewege and Thomsett, 2019). The aim is simply to push customers into this world, as other authors have stated, not only to change traditional parameters, but also to improve the customer experience.

Regarding the evolution of business centres, the trend since the outbreak of the first crisis has been, as we have seen, to reduce costs, given the impossibility or difficulty of increasing profits. This is mainly due to the interest rates set by the European Central Bank.

Continuing with the reduction in costs and capitalising on the aforementioned Covid situation, the change in habits led to the majority of operations being carried out via computer or mobile phone. This development was analysed by Maudos (2017). Moreover, following the example set by other leading institutions in this form of service provision, and valuing their success (Sáiz, 2019), our three banks followed a parallel path to the same end.

The evolution of this parameter is more accelerated in terms of percentages than that of human resources, although as the number is lower and the maximum and minimum figures are smaller, the trend curves do not reflect this reality.

As can be seen in Graph 3, Banco Santander (2011 - 2021) reduced its retail centres by 30% in the last financial year (2021). BBVA (2011 - 2021), which is not far behind, closed 25%. The case of CaixaBank (2012 - 2021) cannot be analysed because the absorption of nearly 2,000 branches of the merged Bankia would distort its inclusion.

Graph 3. Business centres

Source: Prepared by authors (2022)

In the case of the employee/office ratio, pooling the three entities reveals an apparently clear basis for fewer, better-equipped centres (in terms of human and technical resources). In this sense, Álvarez et al. (2006) and Cimarra (2020) refer to the reduction of installed capacity as a basis for cost reduction. However, not all entities follow the same criteria, theoretically deriving the result in some cases from the fact that it is easier to close centres than to terminate contracts with personnel in the service of the entity. This is either due to ethical criteria or criteria that aim to avoid the stigma of social rejection, which can result from redundancy plans or massive contract terminations at companies that declare profits in the billions of euros.

Graph 4 shows the evolution of BBVA (2011 - 2021), whose situation of fewer but better-equipped centres is the result of an action initiated nearly a decade ago, as mentioned above. Banco Santander’s customer relationship guidelines are governed by criteria similar to those indicated above. CaixaBank which, after the absorption of Bankia became the main national operator with 25.2% of deposits, 24.2% of loans, 33.9% of pension plans, 24.5% of investment funds, etc. (CaixaBank, 2022), has experienced such a high increase in employees and branches that it distorts the data of the previous evolution, not having considered its exposure.

Graph 4. Employee/office ratio

Source: Prepared by authors (2022)

In terms of results for the financial year, adding the data for the two multinational banks to their results in Spain, it is important to note that only BBVA (2011 - 2021) recorded losses in the years of the “outbreak” of both crises (2012 and 2020), as shown in Graph 5. The study by López and González (2014) highlights the possibility of predictability that the examination of profits confers.

Graph 5. Results for the financial year (data in millions of euros)

Source: Prepared by authors (2022)

For BBVA, in both cases the declared losses were covered by the bank’s capital surpluses and by more significant contributions to the income statement from other regions outside Spain (significantly Mexico and Turkey).

Regardless of the negative figure provided by BBVA’s Spanish subsidiary, all banks move within similar parameters, with a reduction in profits in times of crisis, given the significant provisions made to cover expected defaults.

On this point it is important to note the enormous difference between the two crises analysed, the first of which, in addition to a gestation period of years, extended after its onset and continued to linger for a number of years. The second, which arose stronger and in the short span of a few months, after years of work by banks and compliance with regulators’ guidelines, prompted quicker solutions, given the numerous, swift measures implemented by the European Central Bank, the most urgent of which are detailed in Table 1.

Table 1. Emergency regulations issued by the ECB in 2020

TYPE OF ACTION

ENFORCEMENT DATE

ACTION

SUPPORT TO CREDIT

MARCH/20

Proposal for more favorable terms in refinancing operations with specific objective (TLTRO-III).

Financing offer to commercial banks between march 2020 and June 2020 (LTRO)

Performance of weekly USD transactions at 84 days expiration. Daily periodicity from 20th of march

APRIL/20

Improvement of TLTRO-III terms

Extraordinary transactions expiring on September 2021

EASING OF WARRANTY CRITERIA

MARCH/20

Announcement of adjustments to the warranty criteria.

-20% reduction on collaterals valuation

APRIL/20

Enlargement of the universe of eligible assets in ACC

ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMM

MARCH/20

APP. Purchase of assets worth 120 MM.€ until December 2020.

PEPP. Extraordinary purchase program for 750 MM.€

JUNE/20

PEPP. Additional 600 MM.€ increased value extended until late 2021 and reinvestments until late 2022.

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on ECB data (2022)

Finally, the efficiency ratio shown in Graph 6 is the last of the parameters analysed in this study, given that it serves as a reflection of the overall evolution of the rest.

Graph 6. Efficiency ratio

Source: Prepared by authors (2022)

BBVA, with the slight upturns recorded from the takeovers in 2012 and 2015 (Unnim Banco and Caja Cataluña), has maintained a path of permanent evolution, to become, with 45.2 points, the best bank in the large Spanish banking segment, and one of the best in Europe, where the average is 66.6 points (Spain 52.1%). The bank’s efficiency reflects permanent, steady growth since 2015 (last takeover), as shown in Graph 6.

With respect to Banco Santander (2011-2021), the score obtained in Spain is 48.8 points, which represents an impressive improvement compared to 53.2 points in 2020. In Europe, however, the efficiency ratio is 53, and 48.8 for the whole bank. The completion of the takeover of Banco Popular and the massive closure of branches, together with the redundancy program initiated in 2021, contributed to the aforementioned figures.

In the case of CaixaBank (2012-2021), the figures obtained from the takeover of the fourth largest national operator are included, which, at the initial stages of implementation, distorts the figures obtained. The labour regulation files, together with the announced job redundancies and the closure of branches, will lead to a change in this parameter, all while the bank is stabilizing after a period of successful growth.

The lower ratio in 2019 is due to the high amounts provisioned to compensate the massive departures of employees (redundancies) that the merger would generate. Thereafter, under European banking parameters, BBVA on a Spanish and global level, and Banco Santander on the global level (not national), became two institutions with the highest efficiency-derived management ratings.

5. Conclusions

The aim of this study is to analyse i) the duality of human resources, as creators of ideas and developers of work systems, and ii) the efficiency that is generated as a plus from this managerial action and change of course, in terms of resource management. The analysis is based on a sample of financial institutions in Spain, representing just over 60% of the market.

One consideration that can be made from the literature examined in the preparation of this study is the change in the ways and systems of working that have been customary since banking began. These working patterns, regardless of the help from machines and, more recently, computers, have always focused on attracting and providing personalized customer service, presenting the manager as someone who contributes value to the relationship, generally in terms of knowledge and specialisation.

The reduction of margins resulting from close competition from traditional market players, coupled with competition from other entities focused on new technologies, and official interest rates at around zero percent for years, caused institutions to search for profitability through the implementation of new forms and systems of work. These new specificities seek and entail the reduction of costs by reducing business centres and human resources. The evolution of BBVA’s and Santander’s figures is very similar, likewise at CaixaBank, until 2021. At BBVA, the number of branches fell from 3,032 to 1,886 between 2011 and 2021, and from 28,934 employees to 24,843. Banco Santander has gone from 4,629 branches and 28,252 employees in 2011 to 1,947 branches and 23,035 employees. For its part, CaixaBank, with the aforementioned particularities, evolved from 6,342 branches to 3,782 from 2012 to 2020, although the reduction in employees is lower, given that the figures would be 30,442 and 28,454 in the first and last years, respectively.

These reductions were given a boost by the systems generated during the Covid-19 pandemic (psychoanalysis management parameters), within the overall interpersonal shift. With warnings to avoid contact in an effort to curtail the spread of the virus, financial institutions and many other types of businesses implemented changes in customer relations, taking advantage of these trends in the search for greater and recurring profit, replacing physical presence by technology (use of alternative channels, apps, etc.). The increase in the employee/office ratio is an example of this substitution. At BBVA, as a working guideline set by its former chairman, as mentioned above, the ratio has risen from 9.54 to 13.17 in 10 years; at Santander, from 6.10 to 11.83; and at CaixaBank from 4.80 to 7.52 in 2020 (the last year of study possible with objective data due to the aforementioned merger). This redefinition of the activities of bank employees also involves commercial attention through different channels. At the end of 2021, Banco Santander had 900 managers of these channels, handling the 7% of consumer finance and the 25% of the bank’s confirming volume (CaixaBank, 2021b).

Another relevant conclusion drawn is that the two crises were resolved differently, with solvency and effectiveness figures in the latter being much higher than those recorded in the subprime crisis. There is, however, an important parallel between the profitability of the institutions as reflected in the efficiency ratio and the profit margin. In all cases, we start from efficiency ratios that, after the apparent rebound from the first crisis in 2015, do not improve relatively, as is the case of BBVA with almost 10 points between 2011 and 2021 (from 49.9 to 45.2), but they at least remain within similar parameters (Santander from 47.0 in 2011 to 48.8 in 2021). CaixaBank, with the various takeovers carried out, does not register a stable evolution parameter. The results obtained suggest an immediate recovery after the crisis of 2020, without the slowdown caused by the aforementioned “brick crisis”.

Despite the large volume of data used, there are limitations without which the results and the conclusions derived could be fully objective. One limitation is related to the sample, given that it is made up of three institutions representing just over 60% of banks in Spain. A higher percentage could have been considered, if not the total number of Spanish institutions. The study has also been placed within the framework of national institutions, without considering the first level of the framework regulated by the European Union and controlled by the European Central Bank. Finally, another limitation is that the study covers little more than a decade, in an attempt to span the period in which both crises occurred.

Declaration of conflicts of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest in relation to the research, authorship, or publication of this work.

Funding

The authors have received no financial support for research, authorship and/or publication of this work.

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* Corresponding author.

Email: alvaro.saiz@urjc.es